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I. INTRODUCTION
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1
changed the relationship between administrative agencies and the
courts that frequently review agency action.2 Chevron established a
famous two-step analysis for determining whether an agency
interpretation of a statute will be given controlling weight by reviewing courts. Step One requires that a court—using “traditional
tools of statutory construction”3—determine whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise point at issue or whether the statute

1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has

Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 781 (2010) (“In
Chevron . . . , the Supreme Court announced a startling new two-step approach to judicial
review of statutory interpretation by administrative agencies . . . .”). However, not all
commentators see Chevron as revolutionary. See, e.g., Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long
Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1867 (2015) (“Chevron is not a revolutionary shift of
authority from the judiciary to the executive. That Chevron is dead.”).
3. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (“If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect.”).
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is ambiguous.4 If a court finds ambiguity or silence in the statute, it
assumes that the ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation by
Congress to the agency to interpret the statute authoritatively.5 In
such cases, the court proceeds to Step Two, where it asks whether the
agency’s interpretation is a reasonable one. If it is, courts then give
controlling weight to the agency’s authoritative interpretation.6
Step One requires courts to make difficult determinations7: Did
Congress directly speak to the precise question at issue in this case?
What does it mean for Congress to speak “directly” or “precisely?”
Step Two’s reasonability analysis can be even less tethered to the
text of the statute, and therefore, more difficult: Is the agency’s
interpretation a “reasonable” one?8 Many of the difficulties presented to courts by the two steps are similar, and as a result, the line
between Step One and Step Two can be blurry.9
Chevron has its fair share of critics and criticisms,10 but the
criticism most relevant to this Comment is that Chevron—though
aimed at reducing judges’ ability to insert their own policy

4. Id. at 842–43.
5. Id. at 843–44.
6. Id. at 844 (“In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a

statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of
an agency.”).
7. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 608–57 (6th ed. 2012) (outlining
difficulties in Chevron’s Step One).
8. According to some scholars, “[t]here is no universally accepted test for
determining when an interpretation is impermissible or, as modern cases tend to frame it,
unreasonable.” Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law out of Nothing at All: The Origins
of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 3 n.10 (2013).
9. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step,
95 VA. L. REV. 597, 597 (2009); Glob. Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomms.,
Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 55–58 (2007) (conducting a muddled Chevron analysis and then concluding
that the agency’s “determination is a reasonable one; hence it is lawful”).
10. Some commentators and judges argue that the doctrine upsets the separation of
powers. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“Chevron deference raises serious separation-of-powers questions.”). Cf. Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 983
(1988) ( “[A]n Article III court must exercise independent judgment concerning all questions
of law that it is called upon to decide. Separation-of-powers values call for this conclusion,
and sometimes emphatically so.”). Others argue that Chevron violates the Administrative
Procedure Act. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083, 1160 (2008) (noting that Chevron deference is incompatible with the APA’s
requirements that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law” and shall
“interpret constitutional and statutory provisions”).
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preferences into ambiguous statutes11—still allows judges to consider those preferences.12 Before the Chevron regime was introduced
in 1984, questions of deference to agency interpretations of law
were generally analyzed under the framework established by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.13 Under Skidmore,
courts examine several factors to determine the persuasive weight
of the agency’s interpretation.14 Because of Skidmore’s malleability,
judges were easily able to slip policy preferences into a decision.
Chevron was supposed to help solve this free agent problem, but
it may not have. Step One allows for enough discretion that courts
can produce results all over the map, and Step Two’s inquiry into
reasonableness or permissibility is even more nebulous. What
seems reasonable to one judge can appear absurd to another, because
our individual experiences easily influence our perception
of reasonableness.15
Especially problematic Chevron cases are those where the question of agency deference hinges on a single term or phrase. In these
cases, the temptation is for judges to reflexively turn to dictionaries
to marshal support for their own intuitions about linguistic ambiguity and the reasonableness of various interpretations. But the
problem is, this type of reasoning allows judges to look out over the
crowd of dictionary definitions and pick out their friends.16
So what can be done? One possible solution is to focus on more
data-driven, transparent approaches to discerning language
meaning. This Comment discusses one possible tool in a judge’s
interpretive toolkit—corpus linguistics—and suggests it can be
11. See supra note 6.
12. See Beermann, supra note 2, at 783 (“Chevron is so pliable that courts applying it

can still reach any desired result . . . .”); see also Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory
Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2154 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (“Chevron . . . is . . . indeterminate—and thus can be antithetical to
the neutral, impartial rule of law . . . .”).
13. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
14. Id. at 140.
15. Cf. Jeffrey Usman, Capital Punishment, Cultural Competency, and Litigating
Intellectual Disability, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 855, 899–900 (2012) (“For judges, cultural attitudes,
values, and beliefs will shape thinking and decision making in a case.”) (internal alterations
and quotations omitted).
16. See ANTONIN SCALIA , A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 36 (1997) (criticizing the “variety and specificity” of results facilitated by the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation).
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used to achieve more objective, data-driven results in Chevron
cases. Corpus linguistics provides access to patterns and trends of
actual language usage and allows for empirical determinations
regarding linguistic meaning. It thus has significant implications
for administrative law by helping courts arrive at more demonstrably accurate semantic conclusions in Chevron cases.
To demonstrate how this can be done, this Comment examines
the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. AT&T Co.17 To begin, Part II of this Comment briefly
reviews the Chevron decision. Part III then introduces corpus linguistics and identifies advantages this approach has over the use of
traditional dictionaries in many contexts. Part IV describes the
Supreme Court’s reasoning and decision in MCI. Part V then
applies a corpus linguistic analysis to the Court’s decision in MCI
and concludes that the Court’s opinion, which held that the term
modify could not reasonably be interpreted to include fundamental
change, was probably incorrect as a matter of ordinary language
use. Data compiled from the Corpus of Historical American English
(COHA),18 the Corpus of Contemporary American English
(COCA),19 and the News on the Web (NOW) Corpus20 demonstrate
that modify can reasonably be used to signify substantial changes,
in addition to minor ones. Part VI then briefly suggests ways in
which corpus linguistics can impact the world of judicial deference
to agency interpretation of law under Chevron.
II. CHEVRON U.S.A. V. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.
In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Air Act.21 In implementing the amendments, the EPA promulgated regulations adopting a

17. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
18. Mark Davies, CORPUS HIST. AM. ENG. (COHA), http://corpus.byu.edu/coha/

(last visited June 22, 2018). COHA contains more than 400 million words from the period
1810 to 2010. Id.
19. Mark Davies, CORPUS CONTEMP. AM. ENG. (COCA), http://corpus.byu.edu
/coca/ (last visited June 26, 2018). COCA contains more than 560 million words of American
English from the period 1990 to 2017. Id.
20. Mark Davies, NEWS ON WEB CORPUS (NOW), http://corpus.byu.edu/now/ (last
visited June 26, 2018). NOW is updated daily and currently contains more than 6 billion
words from 2010 to the present time. Id.
21. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
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plant-wide definition of the term “stationary source,” allowing certain types of polluting entities to make changes to their facilities so long
as the total polluting emissions from the plant did not increase.22
The Natural Resources Defense Council challenged the EPA’s
regulation. The D.C. Circuit set aside the new regulations, reasoning that in light of ambiguity found in the amendments and in
the amendments’ legislative history, “the purposes of the nonattainment program should guide [the court’s] decision.”23 The
court found the EPA’s regulation to be at odds with those purposes
and therefore concluded that the regulation was contrary to law.24
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that
[w]hen a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If,
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute.25

The Court noted that this deference applied to both explicit and
implicit delegations of authority by Congress to agencies.26 In either
case, the Court concluded that “a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.”27
Thus was born one of the most transformative doctrines in
modern Supreme Court history—the Chevron Two-Step—from
what quickly became one of the most important administrative law
22. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
23. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d,

467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
24. Id. at 726.
25. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
26. Id. at 843–44.
27. Id. at 844.
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cases ever decided.28 But despite its importance (or perhaps
because of it), Chevron often proves difficult for courts to apply
consistently. A Chevron analysis combines the difficulty of statutory
interpretation with judgments about reasonability and, therefore,
presents courts with questions to which there are frequently no
easy answers. Fortunately, a branch of linguistics offers ways to
bring more objectivity, empirical accuracy, and transparency into
the semantic inquiry Chevron demands.
III. CORPUS LINGUISTICS
Corpus linguistics is an approach to the study of language use
and function that employs large databases of language, essentially
a “big-data” approach to discovering linguistic meaning. A corpus
linguistics approach typically boils down to “detailed searches for
words and phrases in multiple contexts across large amounts of
text.”29 A corpus can be composed of any language material,30 and
there are reasons for using specialized corpora or constructing
corpora in certain ways.31 At bottom, however, essentially any
person who examines large amounts of naturally occurring
language to discern patterns of use and meaning is using a corpus
linguistic approach. In this way, corpus linguistics analysis is
something that most of us do in our heads every day: We take
instances of language use—from what we read, what we hear, what
we speak, etc.—and analyze them to piece together meaning.
Today, corpora are often enormous in size, with millions or
billions of words, and are analyzed using powerful computer

28. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 512 (1989) (“Chevron has proven a highly important decision—perhaps the
most important in the field of administrative law since Vermont Yankee . . . .”).
29. Michael McCarthy & Anne O’Keeffe, Historical Perspective: What Are Corpora and
How Have They Evolved?, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 3 (Anne
O’Keeffe & Michael McCarthy eds., 2012).
30. TONY MCENERY, RICHARD XIAO & YUKIO TONO, CORPUS-BASED LANGUAGE
STUDIES: AN ADVANCED RESOURCE BOOK 126 (2006) (“Any selection of texts is a sample.
Whether a sample is ‘representative,’ however, depends first of all on the extent to which it
is selected from the range of text types in the target population . . . .”).
31. See id.; see also Randi Reppen, Building a Corpus: What Are the Key Considerations?,
in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 31–32 (Anne O’Keeffe & Michael
McCarthy eds., 2012) (discussing considerations of size, representativeness, collection
methods, and annotation of corpora).
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software.32 Computer analysis of corpora can provide “a new
perspective on the familiar” by allowing analysis on a scale too vast
to be done by hand.33 It can also provide a more scientific, objective
approach to determining linguistic meaning.34 Because of this, corpus linguistic data can have significant advantages over traditional
approaches to deciding language meaning in some contexts.
For example, corpus linguistics analysis can have decided
advantages over simple appeals to dictionaries when it comes to
deciding the “ordinary meaning” of a term.35 The classic case goes
like this: A judge, in resolving a case that requires her to determine
the “ordinary meaning” of a word, will reason that she has found
the ordinary meaning of term X because dictionary Y lists it as the
first definition. But the problem with using dictionaries to make
claims about the ordinary meaning of words is that “dictionaries
do not tell us how words are commonly or ordinarily used.”36 Most
general dictionaries do not claim to rank the definitions they
contain according to relevancy or frequency of use.37 Therefore,
appeals to dictionaries claiming that the first definition listed
should have some sort of special weight are generally misguided,
and these types of arguments have been aptly labeled the “senseranking fallacy.”38 When a court’s holding rests on this type of
reasoning, the conclusion can lack foundation.39
32. Jane Evison, What Are the Basics of Analysing a Corpus?, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 122 (Anne O’Keeffe & Michael McCarthy eds., 2012).
33. SUSAN HUNSTON, CORPORA IN APPLIED LINGUISTICS 3 (2002).
34. See Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE
L.J. 788, 828–29 (2018).
35. See generally Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional
Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915 (2010).
36. J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 2011 UT 38, ¶ 98, 266 P.3d 702, 727
(Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring).
37. See, e.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 17a (2002) (“The
system of separating by numbers and letters reflects something of the semantic relationship
between various senses of a word. It is only a lexical convenience. It does not evaluate senses
or establish an enduring hierarchy of importance among them. The best sense is the one that most
aptly fits the context of an actual genuine utterance.”) (emphasis added); 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY xxxi (1st ed. 1933) (“[T]hat sense is placed first which was actually the earliest
in the language: the others follow in the order in which they appear to have arisen.”).
38. Mouritsen, supra note 35, at 1926–38.
39. Yet the United States Supreme Court has employed this reasoning. For example,
when determining the “ordinary” meaning of the phrase “carries a firearm” in Muscarello v.
United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), Justice Breyer’s majority opinion used the following as
primary support for its conclusion: “Consider first the word’s primary meaning. The Oxford
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Further, language is in constant change, so dictionaries cannot
claim to be either completely exhaustive or completely up to date
in their coverage. It is potentially problematic, then, when a court’s
reasoning is “X cannot possibly mean Y because we can find no
dictionary to support that definition.”40 Dictionaries are not written
to make such determinations. But judges often use these types of
dictionary arguments to bolster their conclusions.
These problems are just as apparent in cases where a court’s job
is not to decide the correct interpretation of a statute but to decide
whether the interpretation advanced by one of the parties is a
permissible or reasonable one—the inquiries required by Chevron. The
problem of determining what permissible or reasonable means in the
context of statutory interpretation is bad enough. This difficulty is
compounded by the question of where judges should turn to make
these determinations of reasonableness or permissibility. Judges
often end up leaning even more heavily on their own linguistic
intuition about whether a term can have a given meaning and then
use dictionaries to support their personal intuition. This is
problematic because people’s own linguistic intuitions are often far
from accurate when compared with actual data of language use.41
Claims about reasonable and permissible interpretations of statutory
terms in some Chevron cases42 are on shaky ground when the court’s
English Dictionary gives as its first definition ‘convey, originally by cart or wagon, hence
in any vehicle, by ship, on horseback, etc.’ 2 Oxford English Dictionary 919 (2d ed. 1989);
see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 343 (1986) (first definition: ‘move
while supporting (as in a vehicle or in one’s hands or arms)’); Random House Dictionary of
the English Language Unabridged 319 (2d ed. 1987) (first definition: ‘to take or support from
one place to another; convey; transport’).” Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128 (original typefaces retained).
40. But Supreme Court Justices and Federal Circuit Court judges have done this too.
See, e.g., Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1180 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he majority does not cite even a single dictionary definition in support of that reading,
despite the oft-cited principle that a definition widely reflected in dictionaries generally
governs over other possible meanings.”); Gibson v. Parish, No. 08-7103, 2010 WL 104553, at
*974, *980 (10th Cir. Jan. 13, 2010) (“[Plaintiff] does not cite to any dictionary to support her
argument, and we have found none adopting that definition.”).
41. See Reppen, supra note 31, at 31 (“Unlike straightforward grammaticality judgments, when [people] are asked to reflect on language use, [their] recall and intuitions about
language often are not accurate.”).
42. This Comment does not argue for a general application of corpus linguistics in all
types of Chevron cases. Rather, the type of case in which corpus linguistics has the most to
offer is a case like MCI, where the question of deference hinges on the reasonable or
permissible meaning(s) of a single term or phrase. While a discussion of other types of
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main authority for its conclusion is a judge’s linguistic intuition
buttressed by a dictionary.
Common corpus linguistic methodologies can help avoid some
of these problems. One such method is the use of concordance lines.
Concordance analysis involves a computer-aided search of a
database where the user searches for a single term or phrase. The
search results are displayed as lines of text from the corpus that
include the search term, usually in the center of a line or section of
text.43 Concordance analyses are useful in examining the “sense,”44
or connotation of a word, in a given context.45 The target word’s
semantic context, as evidenced by the concordance line, can help
determine the appropriate sense in which the word is being used.
While a concordance analysis, like a dictionary, cannot claim to be
exhaustive or detail every possible sense of any given term (because
it would be impossible to ever build a database that includes every
instance of a word’s use in the history of a language), it does allow
for a much closer analysis of whether a given term can bear a
certain meaning.
A related corpus method is the study of collocates. Collocates
are words that co-occur in significant ways.46 In essence, collocate
analysis adapts the old adage that a person can know a word by
looking at the company it keeps.47 Many corpora allow examination

judicial deference to agency views is beyond the scope of this Comment, the problems
discussed here are also apparent in cases applying what is known as Seminole Rock or Auer
deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations. In such cases, a court is required
to give controlling weight to agency interpretations of their own regulations unless the
agency’s interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
43. See JOHN SINCLAIR, CORPUS, CONCORDANCE, COLLOCATION 32 (1991) (“A concordance is a collection of the occurrences of a word-form, each in its own textual environment.
In its simplest form, it is an index. Each word-form is indexed, and a reference is given to the
place of each occurrence in a text.”).
44. “In linguistics a word sense is the meaning ascribed to a word in a given context.”
Alice Ruggeri & Luigi Di Caro, Linguistic Affordances: Making Sense of Word Senses, in
PROCEEDINGS AIC 2013: 1ST INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
COGNITION 136 (2013).
45. See Rosamund Moon, What Can a Corpus Tell Us About Lexis?, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 204–05 (Anne O’Keeffe & Michael McCarthy eds., 2012).
46. See HUNSTON, supra note 33, at 68 (“Collocation is the tendency of words to be
biased in the way they co-occur.”).
47. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 34, at 832.
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of the words that frequently appear in close proximity to a given
search term. A collocate search will examine every use of the “node
word” and give a statistical summary of words with which it
frequently appears—i.e., the word’s collocates. Collocation analysis
is extremely useful in identifying the semantic properties of a given
word or phrase.48
This Comment uses both methodologies discussed above—
concordance and collocate analysis—to test Justice Scalia’s claims
about the semantic range of modify. Both analyses suggest that
Justice Scalia’s argument—that modify could not connote
substantial or fundamental change—was incorrect from a semantic
point of view. 49
IV. MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP. V. AT&T CO.
This brings us to the Supreme Court’s decision in MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co.50 At first blush, the case seems
relatively routine—a fight over whether the Federal Communication Commission’s construction of the statutory provision at
issue qualified for deference under Chevron. But the case stands out
because the majority relied heavily on dictionary arguments to
reach its conclusions about the meaning of modify.
AT&T has a long history of government regulation, primarily
due to its long-held monopoly over many types of telecommunications services in the United States.51 One of the statutes
passed to regulate the industry was the Telecommunications Act of
1934.52 As amended, § 203(a) of the Act requires communications
common carriers to file tariffs with the Federal Communications

48. See DOUGLAS BIBER, SUSAN CONRAD & RANDI REPPEN, CORPUS LINGUISTICS:
INVESTIGATING LANGUAGE STRUCTURE AND USE 43–51 (1998).
49. It is probably a good time to note that sometimes even an extended corpus
linguistic analysis can fail to demonstrate conclusively which sense of the word is being used
in a given example. Some language is truly ambiguous, and even a corpus linguistic
approach cannot solve the problem of true ambiguity. But often, ambiguous language has
probative value to the issue being analyzed. This is clearly the case in Chevron’s Step One,
where ambiguity is the threshold determination courts are required to make.
50. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
51. Id. at 220.
52. Id.
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Commission (FCC).53 The FCC, as the agency charged with
implementing the Act, is authorized under § 203(b) to “modify any
requirement” of the tariff filing provision.54
The Telecommunications Act aimed, at least in part, to make
sure that the rates being charged by AT&T for their long-distance
services were reasonable and did not discriminate.55 Eventually, as
the market became more competitive, the FCC decided to relax the
tariff filing requirement in some ways for non-dominant carriers.56
MCI Telecommunications was one of those non-dominant carriers.57 Eventually, the FCC made the tariff filing completely optional for nondominant carriers, and AT&T challenged the regulation.58 The FCC claimed authority to make these changes under
its power to “modify,” as described in § 203(b).59 The D.C. Circuit
disagreed,60 and MCI petitioned for certiorari.
For the Supreme Court, the case was not a difficult one. The
dispute, according to the majority, “turn[ed] on the meaning of the
phrase ’modify any requirement’ in § 203(b)(2).”61 The Court
disagreed with the Commission’s contention that § 203(b) gave it
“authority to make even basic and fundamental changes” to the
tariff filing requirement.62 To support its conclusion, the Court first
examined the etymology of the word modify.63 It then cited multiple
dictionary definitions of modify, all with the aim of demonstrating
that the term signified only moderate change rather than major or
fundamental change.64 The Court noted that only a single
dictionary—Webster’s Third New International Dictionary—allowed

53. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012) (“Every common carrier, except connecting carriers, shall,
within such reasonable time as the Commission shall designate, file with the Commission
and print and keep open for public inspection schedules showing all charges for itself and
its connecting carriers for interstate and foreign wire or radio communication . . . .”).
54. Id. § 203(b)(2) (“The Commission may, in its discretion and for good cause shown,
modify any requirement made by or under the authority of this section . . . .”).
55. MCI, 512 U.S. at 220.
56. Id. at 221.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 221–22.
59. Id. at 221.
60. AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
61. MCI, 512 U.S. at 225.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 225–26.
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modify to mean significant or major change.65 For the majority,
interpreting modify to connote both major change and minor change
was ridiculous.
When the word “modify” has come to mean both “to change in
some respects” and “to change fundamentally” it will in fact mean
neither of those things. It will simply mean “to change,” and some
adverb will have to be called into service to indicate the great or
small degree of the change.66

The Court continued by stating that “an elimination of the
crucial provision of the statute for 40% of a major sector of the
industry is much too extensive to be considered a ‘modification.’
What we have here . . . is a fundamental revision of the statute . . . . ”67 Because it found that the Commission’s interpretation
went “beyond the meaning that the statute [could] bear,” the Court
concluded that no deference was due to the agency’s interpretation
of modify under Chevron.68
V. CORPUS ANALYSIS OF MODIFY
To examine the Court’s claims about the reasonability and
permissibility of the FCC’s construction of the verb modify, I
examined the term using COHA, COCA, and NOW. To determine
whether the FCC’s construction of the term was “a permissible
construction of the statute,” I examined the term using both a
concordance analysis and a collocation analysis.69 The results show
that the Court was correct in asserting that the most common
meaning of modify is “to change moderately or in minor fashion.”70
But the data also show that modify is sometimes used to connote
serious or even fundamental change. Hence, under the standard
established by Chevron, the Court likely should have accepted the
FCC’s regulation as a “permissible” or “reasonable” construction of

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 227.
Id.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 229.
Although it is likely corpus linguistics could have also resolved the case at Chevron
Step One, this Comment challenges Justice Scalia’s analysis where it seems to have focused
longest—at Step Two.
70. MCI, 512 U.S. at 225.
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the statute, even though the Court did not believe it was the best
possible construction.71
A. Concordance Analysis
I first used a concordance analysis to approach the question of
modify’s meaning, examining data from both COHA and COCA. I
analyzed two sets of concordance lines, each composed of 100
randomized samples returned by my search. The first data set was
composed of concordance lines between the years 1930 and 1939.
(As Justice Scalia points out in his opinion, “the most relevant time
for determining [the] statutory term’s meaning” is 1934, the year
the Communications Act became law.72) To determine how much,
if any, the connotation of modify has changed since the 1930s, I also
examined 100 randomized concordance lines from COCA from
1990 to 1994 (the years immediately surrounding the MCI decision).
In both searches, I used simple syntax, searching for “modify.[v*],”
which instructs the corpus to return all inflections of the verb
to modify.
To determine which sense of modify was being used in each
concordance, I examined the greater context of the concordance.
Based on indicators like modifiers, synonyms, and other structural
features, I then assigned each use of modify to one of three categories: (1) uses of modify that allow for only moderate change (i.e., the
definition of the word favored by the MCI majority opinion);
(2) ambiguous uses (i.e., uses that would allow for both a moderate
only sense of modify and a substantial-change sense); and (3) uses
where modify is employed to mean substantial, fundamental, or
major change.
The data from both time periods were consistent and seemed to
indicate that the Court was incorrect in asserting both (1) that
modify was unambiguous and (2) that construing it to mean major
or fundamental change was an impermissible reading of the
statute. In the results from the 1930s, nearly one-quarter of the uses

71. See supra Part II. An important caveat: This Comment does not attempt to establish
a definitive line marking what counts as “reasonable.” That is a debate for another paper (or
ten). Rather, this Comment assumes that a use that appears roughly one quarter of the time
in general language-use data is likely a “reasonable” interpretation under the strong deference established under Chevron.
72. MCI, 512 U.S. at 228.
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of modify either strongly suggested that it indicated substantial
change or at least would allow such a definition. In the sample, 77%
of the tokens examined indicated that modify suggested only
moderate change. This constituted a strong majority of the uses of
modify, and this result was not surprising. But 23% of the uses either
allowed for a more expansive sense of modify or required it. Of that
23%, 18% of the uses were ambiguous, and would allow for either
a moderate-scope connotation or a substantial-change connotation.
The remaining 5% indicated strongly that modify connoted substantial, significant change. Examples of each type of use are shown
below in Figure 1.
Figure 1. COHA sample concordance lines.
Sense

KWIC73

Moderate-only

“ . . . it is difficult to change or even to modify.”

Ambiguous

“ . . . passive immunity has provided medical men
with the means to modify to a greater or a lesser extent
such bacterial diseases as . . .”

Fundamental

“. . . The House Ways & Means Committee managed
to modify the principle beyond all recognition . . . .”

As can be seen, the context of each example provides clues to
the intended meaning of modify. In the moderate-only sense, modify
is set in contrast to the broader verb to change. As if to drive the
point home, modify is preceded by even, which is used to stress the
difference in scope between change and modify. The second example
of modify is ambiguous, and the verb in this context could bear
either sense. The phrase immediately following modify is most
helpful in determining its possible scope; “to a greater or lesser
extent” plainly suggests that modify could mean to change
substantially or slightly. The last example strongly suggests that
modify means substantial change—even change beyond recognition. If something can be modified to the extent that it is
73.
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unrecognizable, then clearly a substantial, fundamental change of
some sort has taken place.
The data from COCA (1990–94) were similar. Twenty-eight
percent of the uses of modify either strongly suggested that the term
meant substantial change or were ambiguous and would have
allowed for that meaning. Twenty percent of the tokens were ambiguous, 8% suggested that modify meant serious change, and the
remaining 72% of the samples all suggested a moderate-only sense
for modify. So although the percentage of the ambiguous/
substantial uses of modify increased slightly from the 1930s, the
overall proportion remained similar—just over a quarter of the uses
of modify defy Justice Scalia’s claim about its permissible meaning.
Examples from COCA are shown below in Figure 2.
Figure 2. COCA sample concordance lines.
Sense

KWIC

Moderate-only

“. . . replaying the tapes for the majors to modify
and clarify any aspect of the interview . . . .”

Ambiguous

“. . . students must first share their answers with
each other—and possibly modify and/or discuss
them—before their group is finished.”

Fundamental

“. . . and the State Board of Health to modify
existing school posture examinations, transforming them . . . .”

The first example suggests a moderate-only sense for modify by
pairing it with the word clarify. Both words suggest that the
“majors” are merely reviewing recordings of an interview to
suggest any changes that should be made. The phrase “modify and
clarify” essentially excludes the possibility that the “majors” will be
able to fundamentally change the interviews they are reviewing.
The second example is ambiguous. The students in the sentence
will be given the chance to “modify and/or discuss” their answers
to a question before they are finished working in a group. A student
in this situation could “modify” his or her answer either by slightly
413
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changing it or completely changing it. In this context modify could
bear either meaning. The third example suggests that modify means
some sort of substantial change, as the modifications made were
sufficient to “transform” the examinations. Transform obviously
suggests something much more substantial than slight change.
The data collected from the corpus and represented by the
examples in Figure 1 and Figure 2 suggest that the Court’s claims
about possible connotations of modify were incorrect. Although the
clear majority of occurrences of modify did in fact suggest only
minor change, in both time periods nearly one-quarter of the uses
of modify permit (and sometimes require) connotations of major,
fundamental change. This is certainly at odds with Justice Scalia’s
statement that “modify does not contemplate fundamental
changes.”74 Under the highly deferential standard established by
Chevron, a connotation established by nearly 25% of all uses of a
word should qualify as a “permissible” construction of the word.
B. Collocate Analysis
I also analyzed the collocates of modify, in an analysis suggested
in MCI by Justice Scalia himself. He suggested that if modify could
mean both fundamental and minor change, then it had come to be
essentially a synonym for the verb to change. We would know this,
he hypothesized, if adverbs are pressed into service to describe the
degree of change indicated by modify.75 To examine this hypothesis,
I looked at collocate data from three corpora: COHA, COCA, and
NOW. The data from COHA were used to examine modify during
the time when the Telecommunications Act was originally written,
while the COCA and NOW data were taken from the period in
which the Court decided MCI.
The search was again simple: I performed a search for adverbial
collocates of [modify].[v*], set the minimum frequency at five, and
sorted the results by Mutual Information (MI) score.76 I also

74. MCI, 512 U.S. at 228 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).
75. Id. at 227.
76. A Mutual Information (MI) score “expresses the extent to which observed

frequency of co-occurrence differs from what we would expect (statistically speaking). In
statistically pure terms this is a measure of the strength of association between words x and
y.” HarperCollins Publishers, A Guide to Statistics: T-Score and Mutual Information, COLLINS
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specified that I wanted only adverbs that occurred within two
words on either side of the node word, modify. The point was to see
whether the data showed adverbs of scope or degree as significant
collocates of modify. If no adverbs of scope were employed among
the top adverbial collocates of modify, it would suggest that modify
connoted only one thing. But if adverbs of scope collocated frequently vis-à-vis other non-scope adverbs, as Justice Scalia theorized, it would suggest that modify has some sort of inherent
ambiguity and adverbs are used to bring clarity. I performed the
same search for each of the three corpora and examined the twenty
most frequent collocates.77
The data suggest that modify has undergone the very process
suggested by the Court—to some degree, it has become a synonym
of to change. Several adverbs of scope or degree collocated
frequently with modify, including adverbs both expanding and
contracting its scope. For example, in COHA, radically, materially,
profoundly, greatly, and seriously are all in the top six collocates.
These adverbs expand the scope of modify beyond what would be
allowed if the MCI Court had been right—i.e., if modify could only
connote small, incremental, or measured change. The data suggest
that even during the decade in which the Telecommunications Act
was written (1930–39), modify was also used to suggest serious
change. But what is most important is the use of adverbs at all. If,
as the Court claimed, modify always and only connoted incremental
change, then adverbs suggesting a limited scope would be
redundant. And using adverbs that broadened modify’s meaning
would be contradictory and nonsensical.
Looking at data from the time of the decision in MCI, the COCA
data show a similar pattern, but with an important distinction: The
collocates from COCA include words like substantially and significantly, which broaden the scope of modify and are similar to the
collocates from COHA. But the COCA collocates also contain
words like slightly, which do the exact opposite. Slightly narrows
the scope or degree of modify. As mentioned above, if modify could

WORDBANK ONLINE (2008), https://wordbanks.harpercollins.co.uk/other_doc/statistics
.html. Essentially, the higher the MI score, the higher a particular collocate’s relevancy is to
the node word’s semantic properties.
77. I included the top seventeen collocates from COHA rather than the top twenty
because only seventeen collocates occurred with a frequency of five or greater.
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only ever connote moderate, incremental change, slightly would be
redundant. Again, the most important takeaway is that adverbs of
scope are being used with modify at all. That use suggests exactly
what Justice Scalia claimed was impossible—that modify actually
means something like to change, and people use adverbs to show
how much or how little.78
Finally, the data from NOW show a pattern similar to the data
from COCA. Interestingly, slightly ranked even higher in NOW
than in COCA.
To investigate how similar the meaning of modify is to the
meaning of to change, I also analyzed the top twenty adverbial
collocates of the verb to change during the same time periods. My
search methodology was the same as the searches I performed for
modify. The results showed patterning similar to the collocates of
modify: adverbs of scope or degree such as radically, subtly, and
fundamentally all appeared as top collocates for change. This held
true across data from all three time periods and corpora.
The data seem to show that, to a degree, modify is a synonym
for to change and is used frequently in combination with the same
types of adverbs of scope and degree. This suggests, like results of
the concordance analysis, that modify can indeed connote
fundamental, major change. This in turn also suggests that the
FCC’s construction of the phrase “modify any requirement” was
likely a reasonable construction of the statute. Under Chevron, that
is enough, and the Court probably should have deferred to the
agency’s interpretation.
The corpus data suggest not only that modify is a near synonym
for change, but also that modify can connote a change of substantial,

78. These observations about modify track similar observations made recently by the
Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 2016). In Harris, the
Michigan Supreme Court considered the question of whether the statutory term information
could include false statements made by police officers during an internal investigation. The
court concluded—relying at least in part on data obtained from a corpus—that information
includes both true and false statements. Id. at 842. The court noted that the term was
frequently used in conjunction with adjectives that suggest the information may be either
true or false. Id. at 839. “This,” the court concluded, “strongly suggests that the unmodified
word ‘information,’ can describe either true or false statements. . . . Quite simply,
‘information’ in common parlance describes perceptions conveyed about the world around
us, which may be true or false.” Id. The patterning for modify here is similar and warrants a
similar inference.
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even fundamental scope. These conclusions could not have been
reached by a simple appeal to dictionaries—as MCI clearly shows.
Neither could these conclusions have been reliably reached by
individual linguistic introspection. As we see, corpus linguistics
can help judges reach these sorts of objective conclusions about
language meaning in cases where the semantic properties of words
can be outcome determinative.79
VI. IMPLICATIONS
This Comment suggests that corpus linguistics can help judges
determine the ordinary meaning of a term at issue in a Chevron case.
Corpus linguistic analysis discourages arbitrary decision-making
about linguistic meaning, adds transparency, and has the potential
to bring greater uniformity to areas of law—like Chevron cases—
where it is severely lacking.

79. Of course, none of this is to say that using corpus linguistics in legal interpretation
has gone uncriticized. In their recent article, Lee and Mouritsen outline several major
criticisms aimed at corpus linguistics in the law. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 34, at 865–
76. First is the “proficiency critique,” which says “judges and lawyers should leave the
linguistic analysis to professional linguists—meaning, in practice, to expert witness reports
or testimony.” Id. at 865. While admitting that this criticism “has some bite” because “corpus
linguistics is not ‘plug and play’ analysis,” Lee and Mouritsen note that this critique is more
a word of caution to judges to acknowledge the limits of the corpus linguistics tool than it is
a judgment that the tool shouldn’t be used in the first place. Id. at 866. The second critique
Lee and Mouritsen note is the “propriety critique”: Judges should avoid conducting an
independent investigation of facts that goes beyond the issues briefed by any of the parties.
Id. at 868–69. But, as Lee and Mouritsen note, this criticism is misaimed: The relevant ethics
rules aim at independent investigation of adjudicative facts, not independent investigation of
linguistic meaning. Id. 869–70. A rule to the contrary would often outlaw many accepted
interpretive practices, including some uses of dictionaries. Id. at 870. A third concern has
been raised that corpus data may show a specific sense to be a more common iteration of a
term in the real world, but the most factually common iteration of a term may not necessarily
reflect the sense that lawmakers, or even the governing public, had in mind. Id. at 873–74.
Lee and Mouritsen note that this does not deprive corpus data of their probative value. The
“top-of-mind sense” of a term will often help determine the “ordinary public meaning” by
indicating the sense with which the average member of the public would likely be most
familiar. Id. And in cases where the corpus data indicate a lack of a dominant sense, these
data will be probative as well, perhaps indicating that it’s time for judges to employ a canon
of construction or some other rule to function as a tiebreaker. Id. at 875–76. Finally, Lee and
Mouritsen note that corpus linguistics could be attacked as only applying to their chosen
theories of interpretation: originalism and textualism. Id. at 876. However, they assert that
even avowed “anti-textualists” have an interest in demonstrating that the text is indeterminate and therefore inconclusive. Id. at 877. This is not a comprehensive list of critiques that
have been or will yet be leveled against the use of corpus linguistics, but it does present some
of the more salient criticisms and some brief responses.
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First, corpus linguistics can discourage arbitrariness in determining a term or phrase’s meaning. Corpus data allow judges to
make decisions on actual language use in the real world rather than
on internal semantic intuition.
Next, corpus linguistics can bring added transparency and
consistency to decisions about word meaning. If a corpus analysis
is done correctly, it is replicable and can be examined by anyone
willing to invest the time in an analysis. Judges who disagree about
the semantic properties of a term or phrase will be able to debate
the issue in a way that encourages objectivity. Some disagreements
may remain, but corpus linguistics moves the debate from the
inside of judges’ minds into the open. This, as a simple rule-of-law
value, is preferable to the alternative: decisions about the meaning
of words that have no support but a dictionary definition and a
judge’s intuition.
Finally, corpus linguistics can help bring uniformity to the
question of what “ambiguous” means in the Chevron context. The
data for modify showed a rough 75/25 split: 75% of the time, modify
connoted moderate change, while 25% of the time it allowed or
required a more expansive sense. In the author’s opinion, 25% is
enough to suggest that a term is ambiguous, but that is beside the
point. More importantly, corpus linguistics yields actual data. Such
data can provide a settled background against which judges can
more accurately draw a line defining ambiguity and, thereby,
create and apply a more consistent standard.
Corpus linguistics is not a magic bullet and cannot solve every
problem judges face when deciding Chevron cases. It can, however,
provide a clear, objective way for judges to analyze questions of
meaning in a way that reflects actual language usage.
Jacob Crump*
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